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Abstract—Wireless ad hoc networks provide the 
communications platform for new technologies and applications, 
such as vehicular ad hoc networks or wireless mesh networks. 
However, their multihop wireless nature makes them inherently 
unreliable and vulnerable, since their overall performance 
depends on the cooperative packet forwarding behavior of each 
individual node. In this paper we present a role-based approach 
that uses a distributed management overlay and gathers 
information about the packet forwarding activities of each node 
in the network. Using policies to control an adaptive algorithmic 
method that monitors the individual behavior of each node, we 
show that it is possible to detect, accuse and punish misbehaving 
nodes with a high degree of confidence. Our evaluation results 
demonstrate that after the successful detection of misbehaving 
nodes, their punishment through network isolation can 
significantly improve network performance in terms of packet 
delivery and throughput. 
Index Terms— wireless ad hoc networks, misbehavior 
detection, policy-based management, self-protection. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
ireless Ad Hoc Networks consist of end-user devices 
capable of multihop communication, optionally 
supported by limited infrastructure. This definition attempts to 
approach wireless and mobile ad hoc networking as a 
paradigm rather than as a specific technology [1, 2]. As 
MANETs become integrated with today’s networks there is an 
increasing need to make them reliable. In such multihop 
environments where users rely on their peers for the 
forwarding of packets towards destinations, it is essential that 
the packet forwarding functionality is not compromised. For 
example, communication between peers can be affected by the 
presence of malicious nodes that decide to misbehave by 
dropping a subset of packets in order to hinder the overall 
network performance while avoiding security measures in 
place. Network layer misbehavior can be divided into two 
categories [3]: routing misbehavior (failure to behave in 
accordance with a routing protocol) and packet forwarding 
misbehavior (failure to correctly forward packets on behalf of 
other network peers). Our proposed approach focuses on the 
protection of the data forwarding functionality in multihop 
wireless networks. Although this approach can be integrated 
with routing protection schemes, we consider routing 
misbehavior out of the scope of this work. 
Our protection scheme consists of two modules in each 
node: one that works in the network layer and another that 
works in the management plane. The network layer module 
consists of an algorithm that performs three tasks: 1) collects 
and aggregates behavior metrics on the active nodes in the 
network, 2) detects misbehaving nodes that maliciously drop 
packets above a configurable limit, and 3) accuses and 
punishes nodes that are persistently detected to be 
misbehaving. The management plane module uses policies to 
control and adjust the network layer module. The interworking 
of both modules drives network adaptation based on current 
conditions and the objectives of high-level entities, such as a 
network administrator or manager. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II 
describes related work in the area of multihop wireless 
network security and policy-based management. Section III 
introduces and presents our proposed protection scheme, while 
Section IV presents a case study and the evaluation of our 
approach. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section V along 
with directions for future work.  
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK 
An evolving approach towards MANETs [1, 2] is evident in 
their definition by the IETF, which has taken a pragmatic 
perspective regarding research in wireless ad hoc networking. 
In 1999, IETF’s MANET WG defined a MANET as an 
autonomous system of mobile nodes (RFC2501). In 2007, the 
newly formed IETF AUTOCONF WG (Ad-Hoc Network 
Autoconfiguration) defined a MANET as a loosely connected 
domain of routers. In addition, market momentum [2, 4] gives 
a renewed view of ad hoc networking. This is indicative of the 
abandonment of MANETs’ isolation and their need to coexist 
and integrate with today’s networks. A wealth of work can be 
found in the literature, investigating both misbehavior 
protection mechanisms at the network layer and policy-based 
management. However, to the best of our knowledge no 
previous work addresses misbehavior protection with the use 
of management level policies.  
Approaches have been proposed that provide security in 
existing ad hoc routing protocols through the enhancement and 
removal of some of their features. Examples of such protocols 
are the secure efficient distance vector (SEAD) routing [5] 
which is based on the destination sequenced distance vector 
(DSDV) [6], and the secure on-demand distance vector 
(SAODV) routing protocol [7] based on AODV [8]. Extending 
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the dynamic source routing (DSR) protocol to provide it with 
security mechanisms is the secure on-demand routing protocol 
for ad hoc networks (Ariadne) [9] and CONFIDANT 
(Cooperation of Nodes: Fairness In Dynamic Ad-hoc 
NeTworks) [10]. These approaches are complementary to our 
packet forwarding protection scheme since they secure the 
path discovery and establishment functionality of routing 
protocols. 
There has been work that aims to provide reliable network 
connectivity by detecting packet forwarding misbehavior. 
WATCHERS (Watching for Anomalies in Transit 
Conservation: a Heuristic for Ensuring Routing Security) [11] 
is a protocol designed to detect disruptive routers in fixed 
networks by making use of the principle of conservation of 
flow in a similar way to our approach. However, WATCHERS 
is designed to work in fixed networks and is not applicable to 
MANETs. 
Traffic transmission patterns have been studied [12] as a 
means to detect packet forwarding misbehavior using medium 
access control (MAC) layer techniques that preserve the 
statistical packet forwarding regularity from hop to hop. 
SCAN (self-organized network layer security in mobile ad hoc 
networks) [3] focuses on securing packet delivery. SCAN uses 
AODV [8] but argues that the same ideas can be adapted to 
other routing protocols. The authors of [13] propose a system 
based on DSR composed of two modules that reside in all 
network nodes: a watchdog which identifies misbehaving 
nodes and a pathrater which helps DSR to avoid such nodes.  
As observed, the above approaches rely on predefined 
parameters and hard-wired logic to execute the required 
protection tasks. This results in a lack of flexibility and the 
failure to integrate with and adapt to the network management 
objectives. In addition, they need to be configured by a 
specialist familiar with the underlying algorithms. The 
solutions to these issues of network management have been 
envisioned in the policy-based management (PBM) paradigm. 
PBM simplifies the complex management tasks of large scale 
systems, since high-level policies monitor the network and 
automatically enforce appropriate actions in the system [14]. 
In general, policies are defined as Event-Condition-Action 
(ECA) clauses, where on event(s) E, if condition(s) C is(are) 
true, then action(s) A is(are) executed. PBM approaches for 
wireless networks have been proposed in [15, 16, 17]. At the 
same time, industry envisions autonomic computing as 
dynamically managed by business rules and policies [18], 
fuelling further interest in policy-based solutions. The basic 
components of a PBM system are the Policy Repository (PR), 
the Policy Management Tool (PMT), the Policy Decision 
Point (PDP) and the Policy Enforcement Points (PEP) [19]. 
The PR encapsulates the management logic to be enforced on 
networked entities. It is the central point where policies are 
stored by managers using a PMT and can be subsequently 
retrieved by PDPs. Relevant policies can be retrieved and 
interpreted by a PDP, which in turn provisions any decisions 
or actions to its controlled PEPs. Motivated by the capability 
of PBM systems for adaptability, our work employs a policy-
based framework for MANETs [15, 16] as the management 
overlay where policies are defined and the network is 
algorithmically organized [20]. 
III.  ADAPTABLE MISBEHAVIOR DETECTION AND ISOLATION 
Our mechanism uses an adaptable method to detect packet 
forwarding misbehavior based on the principle of flow 
conservation [11] and the use of policy-based management 
(PBM) [14]. Such adaptability allows the system to judge the 
behavior of nodes and decide whether they should, or not, be 
accused of misbehavior and penalized according to current 
network management policies. Our approach is deployed over 
a role-based wireless network, organized in a hybrid tiered 
manner [15]. Nodes are assigned a role that defines the tasks 
they are responsible for as well as the policies that apply to 
them. For example, depending on their role, nodes may hold 
behavior information about their neighbors, a localized 
network section or the entire network. 
Our approach differs from existent schemes, such as our 
previous work [21], since it does not rely on promiscuous 
listening to determine either the nodes that are not forwarding 
packets or the active neighborhood of a node. All relevant 
calculations and subsequent decisions are based on metrics 
directly acquired by nodes actively sending and receiving 
packets. Likewise, the problem posed by nodes that constantly 
change their geographical position in a clever manner (without 
going back to previously visited areas) to avoid the security 
measures in place is solved in this new scheme because nodes 
making the accusation decision have a holistic network 
misbehavior view. Also, to the best of our knowledge, our 
proposal is the first attempting to connect misbehavior 
detection and accusation with the use of policies at the 
management plane. By allowing policies to manipulate key 
features of our algorithm, such as the misbehavior detection 
threshold and the maximum expected percentage of false 
accusations, the network manager or administrator can fulfill 
the requirements stipulated by high level management goals, 
e.g. the desired security level. 
A. Detection Phase 
Our approach can be divided into two main phases: 
gathering of behavior information for misbehavior detection, 
and accusation with penalty enforcement. The former involves 
collecting and aggregating behavior information in the low 
levels of the hybrid tiered network and taking it to the top 
level for analysis in order to detect misbehaving nodes. The 
second phase on the other hand starts at the top level by 
deciding which nodes to accuse of misbehavior and how to 
penalize them, and continues with the enforcement of the 
respective penalties by the bottom tiers. 
The proposed detection procedure is based on the clustered 
organization of the underlying wireless ad hoc network. 
Clustering is an effective method to reduce traffic overhead in 
wireless networks, both for routing (e.g. the selection of 
multipoint relay nodes in OLSR [22]) and management 
purposes [15]. By selecting cluster heads and forming clusters, 
scalability can be increased and locality is preserved. 
Therefore we have adopted an existing policy-based 
framework to facilitate the role-based detection phase. By 
exploiting a fully distributed algorithm for cluster creation and 
maintenance [20], the framework dynamically assigns a role to 
each device, taking into consideration its capabilities and 
mobility attributes [16]. Three roles are defined, namely 
manager node (MN), cluster head (CH) and cluster node (CN). 
For modularity, a MN encapsulates the functionality of a CH 
and in turn a CH encapsulates that of a CN. An algorithmic 
process is used for dynamic cluster creation by selecting the 
most capable nodes as cluster heads, while remaining nodes 
become CNs and register with their nearest CH. Details and 
evaluation of the algorithm in MANETs can be found in [16]. 
A CH uses a PDP to locally manage the PEP of CNs that 
belong to its cluster and communicates with other CHs to 
exchange management information, including policies. 
Management policies are defined at MNs and are distributed to 
CHs for enforcement on CNs. For the rest of this paper, we 
assume a clustered wireless ad hoc network with a pre-
assigned number of MNs and dynamic algorithmic selection of 
CHs. 
Misbehavior detection in our algorithm is based on the 
principle of flow conservation [11]. This states that all 
bytes/packets that enter a node that is not their destination are 
expected to exit the node. In order to apply this principle in 
MANETs it is necessary to keep track of the number of 
packets successfully forwarded by each node in the network. 
In our approach each network node vi, regardless of its role, 
maintains a table with two metrics Tij and Fji for every other 
node vj to which vi has either sent or received packets. Tij is the 
number of packets that node vi has transmitted to node vj for vj 
to forward to another node, and Fji is the number of packets 
that node vj has forwarded to node vi that did not originate at 
vj. Thus, if we consider Uj to be the neighborhood of node vj 
excluding itself, Eq. 1 holds for well behaved nodes when 
threshold is set to an appropriate value as we shall see later. [21] 
gives a more formal definition and detailed explanation of the 
principle of flow conservation applied to MANETs. 
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Eq. 1 states that the number of packets forwarded by node vj 
should be at least a fraction of those packets transmitted to vj 
for vj to forward. The parameter threshold lies between 0 and 1 
and is the fraction of packets that a node is allowed not to 
forward without being detected as misbehaving. 
Eq. 1 is applied to all nodes in the network, which requires 
the gathering and aggregation of the Tij and Fji metrics for each 
active node in the network. Our scheme achieves this by 
requiring all CNs to report their collected Tij and Fji metrics to 
their respective CHs periodically. The period that elapses 
between two consecutive reports depends on the current 
network management policies. CHs aggregate the reported 
metrics including their own. To anticipate node movements, 
aggregated cluster information is passed on from CHs to a 
MN. Finally, MNs exchange behavior information between 
them and perform a new metrics aggregation. At this point, 
MNs have acquired information on the overall network 
behavior as well as on the individual behavior of each active 
node in the network. This allows for the detection of 
misbehaving nodes by applying Eq. 1 to the collected metrics. 
Selecting an appropriate misbehavior threshold threshold is 
very important to avoid false detections, i.e. a state where a 
well-behaved node is mistaken for a misbehaving one. Fig. 1 
illustrates this concept. Simulation details are given in Section 
IV.B. Fig. 1 shows three curves depicting the percentage of 
detections as a function of increasing misbehavior threshold 
for three networks of 60 nodes where all nodes drop the same 
percentage of packets. This means that in the figure, the 
normal node behavior for each network is to drop 70%, 30% 
and 0% of the packets respectively. For these three cases, it is 
assumed that this average behavior is the normal behavior of a 
well behaved node, perhaps due to increased noise or mobility 
issues, and nodes are not expected to be detected as 
misbehaving. Therefore the misbehavior threshold threshold 
should at least be set to a value equal to the packet dropping 
average plus an offset which helps preventing our algorithm 
from falsely detecting well-behaved nodes. For example, in the 
case of the network where nodes drop 30% of its packets 
threshold ≥ 30% + 14% in order to have less than 10% chance of 
detecting a node as misbehaving. In Section III.B we introduce 
a mathematical method that helps selecting an adequate offset 
value. 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Increasing Misbehavior Threshold ( threshold)
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 o
f D
et
ec
tio
n 
(P
D)
70% Drop
30% Drop
00% Drop
 
Figure 1. Probability of detection PD  as a function of the misbehavior 
threshold threshold for different levels of normal network behavior 
Simulations have also been carried out for 20, 40 and 120 
node networks. The curves obtained exhibit the same behavior 
as the 60 node network presented in this section. However, our 
results show that the offset required to give a desired detection 
probability changes slightly between different networks.  
B. Accusation Phase 
As described in the previous section the network behavior 
information is collected, aggregated and sent to MNs for them 
to analyze. Thus, MNs have access not only to the overall 
network behavior but also to each node’s individual behavior 
data. This makes them responsible for controlling and 
adjusting the procedures carried out to detect and accuse 
misbehaving nodes. Therefore the accusation concept 
developed in this section is implemented by MNs. 
A single detection should not be considered sufficient to 
accuse a node of misbehavior since this results in a system 
where the probability of wrongly accusing nodes is very high. 
For this reason, we propose that a node in our scheme be 
accused of misbehavior only if in a number of behavior checks 
ch the node is detected at least d times as misbehaving. Since 
the order of those d detections does not matter, combinatorics 
and probability theory can be used to derive the following 
equation: 
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It follows that the probability of accusation PA depends not 
only on the detection probability PD but also on the number of 
behavior checks ch, which defines our sliding window 
(memory buffer) size, and on the minimum number of 
detections d required for a node to be accused of misbehavior. 
Figures 2 and 3 show how Eq. 2 varies with ch and d.  
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Figure 2. Probability of accusation (PA) as a function of behavior checks (ch) 
for a number of required detections (d) with PD = 80% 
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Figure 3. Probability of accusation (PA) as a function of behavior checks (ch) 
for a number of required detections (d) with PD = 10% 
Fig. 2 presents a set of curves corresponding to a required 
minimum number of detections when the probability of a 
single detection is 80% (PD = 80%). In this graph, the 
probability of accusation PA increases to almost 100% in all 
cases as the number of behavior checks increases from 1 to 10. 
Fig. 3 presents the same information for probability of 
detection PD = 10%. Here the maximum PA reached is 65% 
and corresponds to the case when at least 1 detection out of 10 
behavior checks is needed to accuse a node of misbehavior. 
Figures 2 and 3 allow us to select appropriate values for the 
number of behavior checks ch and the minimum number of 
detections d needed to accuse a node. For example, assume a 
60 node network consisting of two types of nodes: well-
behaved nodes that do not drop packets on purpose, and 
misbehaving nodes that drop 70% of the packets they are 
supposed to forward. 
Fig. 4 shows separately the probability of detection (PD) as 
a function of the increasing misbehavior threshold (threshold) 
for well-behaved nodes, misbehaving nodes, and their average 
behavior for the network in two different states. In state 1 – 
the initial state – 50% of nodes are well-behaved and 50% are 
misbehaving. In state 2 the network has detected and isolated 
half the misbehaving nodes, i.e. 25% of the total number of 
nodes in the network. We see that the state 2 curve resembles 
more the curve for well behaved nodes. In general the more 
misbehaving nodes are isolated the more the average behavior 
of the network resembles that of a network with well-behaved 
nodes only. 
If in our example network, regardless of its state, we set 
threshold = 5% we see from Fig. 4 that PD = 10% for well 
behaved nodes (0% drop). Then if we want to have a 
probability of wrongly accusing well behaved nodes no greater 
than 1%, from Fig. 3 we observe that setting the number of 
behavior checks ch = 4 and the minimum number of required 
detections d = 2 would not satisfy our requirement since in 
such case the probability of accusation PA is about 5%. Instead 
if ch = 5 and d = 3 we obtain that PA is less than 1% (actually 
from equation 2 we know PA = 0.856%). Furthermore, with 
threshold = 5% the probability of detecting misbehaving nodes 
is PD ≈ 98% (from Fig. 4, 70% drop) and by using equation 2 
(with ch = 5 and d = 3) we obtain that the probability of 
accusing misbehaving nodes in our example network is 
virtually 100%. This proof of concept example verifies an 
important property of our protection scheme, i.e. the property 
of exhibiting a low probability of wrongly accusing well 
behaved nodes while maintaining a high likelihood of 
accusing misbehaving ones. 
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Figure 4. Probability of detections PD  as a function of the misbehavior 
threshold threshold for a 60 node  network in two different states 
Our algorithm’s parameters can be manipulated through 
low-level policies in order to adapt the system to the current 
network conditions and at the same time fulfill the goals 
specified by high-level entities. On the other hand, our scheme 
also provides the management plane with information related 
to the current performance of the network. For example, event-
driven policies could be triggered when the overall 
misbehavior of the network exceeds a pre-established limit. 
These policies would execute a set of procedures and 
parameter configurations in order to lead the overall system to 
a new desired state, as explained in the following section. 
C. Adaptability and management policies 
The adaptability of detection and accusation processes is 
achieved in two ways. First, a new method is proposed for the 
calculation of the detection threshold. This configurable 
method uses a weighted algorithm of recent metrics and 
inherently adapts to the dynamic forwarding behavior of 
participant nodes. The second aspect of adaptability is 
achieved with the use of policies, based on the aforementioned 
role-based network organization. Special policies are 
introduced to manage the proposed protection scheme, taking 
into account management objectives and the changing network 
conditions. 
Policies can express the high-level goals of a managing 
entity and can be interpreted into low-level policies that 
dynamically control the operation of participating wireless 
devices. Although policy refinement is currently out of the 
scope of our work, we propose a simplified translation of 
high-level policies (e.g. the level of detection rigidness) and 
variables (e.g. the probability of wrong accusation) to low-
level algorithm configuration (e.g. values for ch and d). This 
functionality enables an entity to predefine the expected 
behavior and performance of the network through policies.  
We have adopted the established ECA policy notation, 
where a policy can be expressed as a statement in the form of: 
<on Event> if <Condition(s)>then<Action(s)>. In spite of its 
simplicity, this notation is quite effective because it provides 
the building blocks for complex management logic. This is 
achieved by creating groups of policies that can be assigned to 
management or organizational roles. For example, different 
policies can apply to devices in the CH and CN role. The use 
of events and conditional expressions in policies provides a 
dynamic element to the management system, making it able to 
adapt to network conditions. E.g. policies can be triggered if 
the node density in an area has become lower than a 
configurable threshold. A sample series of policy types have 
been defined, as seen in Fig.5. 
We classify management policies in two sets, the protection 
scheme set and the network deployment set. Policies in the 
protection scheme set are organized in the security 
requirements and penalization policy groups. The network 
deployment policy set includes an exceptions policy group. 
Each policy group contains a number of policy rules that 
express the low-level policies to be enforced on network 
devices. The modeling of policies in sets, groups and rules 
follows the recommended practices of IETF, as described in 
RFC3460 [23]. The use of multiple policies and dynamic 
conditions to affect the values of the same managed objects, 
introduces the risk of policy conflicts and consequently the 
need to address conflict detection and resolution (CDR) in our 
future work. 
 
Figure 5. Policy types  for adaptable misbehavior detection and accusation 
The protection scheme policy set aims to facilitate the 
interaction of a managing entity with the underlying methods 
and algorithms that implement the misbehavior detection and 
accusation. In a way, this set provides an abstraction to the 
manager, hiding the complex implementation details and 
offering two high-level parameters that can be dynamically 
manipulated: The detection rigidness expresses the level of 
tolerance the network should exhibit to misbehavior, while the 
accusation accuracy expresses the expected confidence in 
accusing and punishing nodes in the network. These 
parameters offer a mechanism to encapsulate the high-level 
management objectives as enforceable policies, by affecting 
the accusation probability PA and determining the detection 
threshold offset. 
The security requirements group can be further divided in 
packet forwarding misbehavior policies and routing 
misbehavior policies. The latter can be used to control an ad 
hoc routing protection scheme like SAODV [7]. The former 
policies are the ones that manipulate the parameters of our 
protection scheme and provide the desired versatility to 
change according to management objectives. It should be 
emphasized that the proposed policy set interaction not only 
provides the means to influence the protection scheme, but 
also provides the increased adaptability and parameterization 
offered from PBM systems by taking in mind network events 
and other related policy sets (e.g. penalization or network 
deployment groups). 
The penalization group includes policies to control the node 
accusation, punishment, and revocation of punishment. Their 
aim is to refine the actions against those nodes detected as 
misbehaving by deciding when and how to penalize them. The 
importance of this group lays in the fact that it can offer a 
differentiation in the treatment of misbehavior. For example, 
assuming free vs. paid network access, paying customers can 
be offered a lower probability of being falsely accused. 
Accusation policies can provide additional conditions to 
expedite or delay node accusation while punishment policies 
control the type of actions against accused nodes. Revocation 
policies define if and when an accused node can be cleared of 
its current punishment, e.g. stop node isolation in 30 minutes. 
Finally, the network deployment set can be used to express 
policies that prescribe the usage and purpose of the network 
and are not directly related to the proposed protection scheme. 
This set can encapsulate a priory management knowledge like 
the characteristics of the deployment area, the expected user 
mobility and the types of supported applications. Based on the 
above parameters, an exceptions group was created that 
includes similar policies with the penalization group. The 
purpose of this group is to differentiate the penalization of 
nodes depending on the deployment conditions that affect their 
normal behavior. For instance, areas with high mobility are 
expected to have a reduced packet delivery ratio, making 
mobile nodes more prone to misbehavior detection. 
IV. CASE STUDY AND EVALUATION 
In order to evaluate the applicability and implications from 
the use of the proposed detection and accusation scheme, we 
first outline a case study scenario of a wireless ad hoc 
network. We then present the evaluation results regarding key 
aspects of our scheme and use the case study network to 
illustrate its effect regarding performance and management 
objectives. 
A. Case Study Scenario 
Wireless mesh networks are a prominent technology that 
has embraced the wireless ad hoc networking paradigm. A 
self-organizing network integrates a number of privileged 
nodes (mesh routers) that act as gateways for the rest of the 
participating wireless devices. In order to provide connectivity 
in areas out of the range of any gateway, such networks are 
reliant on the packet forwarding behavior of individual nodes 
along the created multihop paths. We assume the deployment 
of a mesh network as a case study scenario and consider a 
number of fixed nodes assigned the MN role, i.e. the devices 
under the direct control of a managing entity. A number of 
mesh routers is also deployed in the examined area and these 
nodes are assigned the CH role. For the purpose of this 
scenario, a number of user devices can be dynamically 
assigned the CH role, based on the adopted role-based 
framework and distributed algorithm (Section III). The rest of 
network nodes assume the CN role.  
TABLE I. Illustrative Management Policies for Adaptive Protection 
P Security Requirements Policy Group 
1 on {startup} if {-}  
then {{set_accus_accuracy(high)}, {set_detect_rigidness(low)}, 
          {set_thresh_method(simple)}} 
2 on {congestion} if {accused_count < 10% } 
then {{ set_accus_accuracy (med)}, { set_detect_rigidness (high)}} 
3 on {congestion} if {accused_ count > 60% } 
then {{set_accus_accuracy (high)}, {set_detect_rigidness(med)}} 
4 on {low_throughput} if { accused_ count < 10% } 
then { set_thresh_method (weighted)} 
 Penalization Policy Group 
5 on {startup} if{-}  then {set_accus_params(ch:=4,d:=2)} 
6 on {startup} if{-}  then {set_punishment(isolation)} 
 Exceptions Policy Group 
7 on {node_check} if {Node.role==CH}^{Node.owner==user} 
then { set_accus_params (ch:=4,d:=3} 
8 on {node_check} if {Node.role==CH}  
then {set_ punishment (warning)} 
All of the participating devices are expected to forward 
packets to facilitate the required multihop communication. In 
order to safeguard the operation of the mesh network, the 
managing entity integrates the proposed protection scheme and 
introduces appropriate policies to control and automate the 
detection and isolation of misbehaving users. As an proof of 
concept, some illustrative policies are included in Table I. The 
effect of our scheme on network performance is demonstrated 
in the simulations subsection that follows. For this case study, 
policies can be used to achieve the following goals: 
1) Control the calculation method of the detection threshold 
based on network conditions (e.g. congestion, P:2,3,4) or 
management objectives (e.g. detection accuracy, P1). 
2) Control the offset based on the desired max probability of 
falsely accusing a well behaved node (P:1,2,3,4). 
3) Differentiate the punishment enforcement based on the 
role, the application and the business model (P:5,6,7,8). 
B. Simulation Results 
We perform our simulations using the GloMoSim [24] 
simulation package. All values shown on our graphs, and their 
respective 95% confidence interval, are the result of averaging 
20 simulation runs. The simulation parameters have been 
selected in order to obtain results that are meaningful when 
coupled with our case study scenario. Unless explicitly stated, 
our simulation parameters take the following values: i) nodes 
move according to the random waypoint mobility model with 
a speed randomly chosen with uniform distribution between 
4m/sec and 6m/sec, yielding a mean node speed of 5m/sec 
(which is about the average speed of a car in a city center), and 
a standard deviation of 0.58m/sec,  ii) the wireless 
transmission range of every node is 100 meters, iii) the node 
density is 5x10-4 nodes/m2 iv) the link capacity is 2 Mbps, v) 
the MAC layer protocol is the IEEE 802.11 DCF, vi) the 
underlying routing protocol is AODV, vii) the total simulation 
time for each scenario is 1800 seconds, and viii) network 
isolation is the punishment enforced for any nodes accused of 
misbehavior. Roles are assigned to each node in the network 
following the adopted role-based framework (Section III). The 
execution of the distributed algorithm for the given fixed node 
density and variable node population yielded a ratio of 
approximately 1:3 for managing nodes (MN and CH) to node 
population. The number of MN is predefined as 3 and remains 
constant for all simulations, while the number of CHs depends 
on network size. Having in mind our case study, MN nodes 
can be operator-controlled mesh routers, while a number of 
user devices are selected as CHs to assist distributed 
management. In this section we first present a set of results 
showing how our protection scheme effectively improves the 
network performance in the presence of misbehaving nodes. 
Then the reaction time of our approach is shown for different 
network sizes and number of nodes. Finally, we demonstrate 
that the overhead introduced by our proposed scheme allows it 
to scale well. 
An important parameter to evaluate the effectiveness of our 
approach is the network throughput gain that it can offer to 
networks affected by misbehaving nodes that drop packets in a 
probabilistic manner. In this section we present results that 
demonstrate that our protection scheme effectively improves 
the average network throughput as it detects and accuses 
misbehaving nodes in the network. For our first set of results, 
simulations for a 20 node network were run in an area of 240 
000m2 (489.9m x 489.9m). The network was set-up with 40% 
of their nodes misbehaving by dropping 80% packets. The 
misbehavior threshold threshold, i.e. the maximum amount of 
packets that nodes are allowed to drop without being detected, 
is 60%. The sliding window size or number of behavior 
checks is ch = 4, and the minimum number of detections 
required for an accusation is d = 2. To improve graph 
readability we omit the calculated confidence intervals. 
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Figure 6. Average network throughput vs. simulation time (120 nodes) 
Fig. 6 depicts the value of the average network throughput 
as the simulation time progresses from 0 to 1800 seconds. The 
graph displays a) networks without misbehaving nodes (No 
Misbehavior), b) networks with misbehaving nodes using our 
proposed protection scheme (Detection & Accusation), and c) 
networks with misbehaving nodes but with no means of 
defending themselves from any type of attack (Misbehavior 
Alone). As it can be seen, our protection scheme effectively 
mitigates the effects of packet forwarding misbehavior in a 
network and offers a substantial improvement on the average 
network throughput. 
For Fig. 7 we consider a 60 node network over a terrain of 
120 000m2 (346.41m x 346.41m). Four groups of misbehaving 
nodes are set that drop 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% of packets 
respectively. Each of the groups consists of 10% of the total 
number of nodes in the network. The remaining network and 
algorithm parameters remain unchanged. For this set of results 
we assume a relaxed security policy with threshold fixed at 70% 
for the first half of the simulation. Half way through the 
simulation policies change the misbehavior threshold from a 
fixed value to be equal to the weighted average network 
behavior plus a pre-established offset (8%). It shows how our 
threshold = 70% policy is very ineffective as the network 
throughput does not improve significantly during the first half 
of the simulation. In the middle of the simulation the 
misbehavior threshold is changed by policies to be the 
weighted average network misbehavior plus an offset of 8%. 
This yields a value much lower than 70% which permits to 
detect and accuse previously undetected misbehaving nodes. 
As these nodes are isolated from the network the throughput 
becomes close to that of a network with well behaved nodes 
only. 
Fig.8 shows the percentage of misbehaving nodes accused 
as the simulation time elapses. However, Fig. 8, unlike the 
previous ones, allows us to see the reaction speed of our 
protection scheme to accuse misbehaving nodes. The curve 
corresponding to the network of Fig. 7 shows that initially 
(with threshold = 70%) only 25% of the misbehaving nodes are 
detected. However, once the misbehavior threshold is set to 
the weighted average network misbehavior plus the 8% offset 
the amount rapidly increases to reach 100%. 
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Figure 7. Average network throughput vs. simulation time (60 nodes) 
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Figure 8. Percentage of misbehaving nodes accused vs. simulation time 
Our final set of results presents the overhead produced by 
our protection scheme compared against the overhead 
produced by the underlying routing protocol (AODV) and the 
CBR traffic load (the application layer traffic). The 
information displayed corresponds to the 120 node network of 
Fig. 6. The mean node speed is increased from 0 to 20 m/sec 
in order to see the effect of mobility on our approach. Fig. 9 
shows the total number of packets for three types of traffic: 
CBR traffic, AODV traffic and our proposed protection 
scheme traffic. The total packet number includes both 
generated and forwarded traffic. As it can be seen from the 
figure, our approach imposes a small overhead on the network 
which is also independent of node speed. This is expected 
since the traffic produced by our approach depends on how 
often behavior metrics are reported rather than on mobility 
issues. The reporting of information is controlled by the 
adopted policy-based framework (Section III) that has been 
investigated for scalability in [16]. Based on our results, we 
conclude that with the correct tuning of reporting parameters 
and its immunity to node speed, our protection scheme can 
scale well to medium and large wireless and mobile networks. 
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Figure 9. Total Network overhead vs. mean node speed (120 nodes) 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have presented an adaptable protection 
scheme that is capable of effectively detecting, accusing and 
punishing nodes that exhibit packet forwarding misbehavior in 
accordance with the changing network conditions and the 
management policies set by high-level entities. The 
effectiveness and efficiency of our approach was verified 
through an extensive set of simulations. 
We have shown that by making use of policies at the 
management plane to control our scheme’s detection and 
accusation parameters, the rigidness and accuracy of our 
approach can be customized in order to punish nodes that 
exhibit different levels of misbehavior in the network. 
Furthermore, different types of punishment can be established 
for nodes that execute different tasks or have different roles in 
the network. Finally, our proposed adaptable protection 
scheme eliminates the need for promiscuous listening 
(overhearing) since behavior evaluation is based on metrics 
directly collected by the actual communicating nodes. 
This work focuses on providing protection to the data 
packet forwarding functionality only. However, within our 
approach there is scope to address the adaptable protection of 
routing protocols and part of our future work is to be aimed at 
this area. Also, in our scheme multiple policies and the 
network dynamic conditions can affect the values of the same 
managed object parameters. This introduces the risk of policy 
conflicts that we expect to address in our future work. 
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